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Abstract 
 
In this contribution the influence of reasonableness on the 
element of conduct in the South African law of delict will be 
analysed and compared with the requirement of some form of 
conduct in English tort law, American tort law and the French law 
of delict. 
Fundamental similarities and differences among the different 
legal systems must be considered. France and South Africa 
follow a generalising approach to determining a delict while 
English and American law have a system of separate torts.  
Even though English and American law do not explicitly refer to 
the requirement of conduct in tort law, it is generally implicitly 
required. This is the case whether one is dealing with the tort of 
negligence or the intentional torts. In French law too, a fait 
générateur (a generating, triggering, wrongful act or event) 
generally must also be present in order to ground delictual 
liability. The concept of fait générateur is broader than the 
concept of conduct found in the other jurisdictions in that it 
extends beyond what is regarded as human conduct. The 
conduct in all the jurisdictions may be in the form of a 
commission (a positive, physical act or statement) or an 
omission (a failure to act). The requirement that conduct must 
be voluntary is generally found in South African, English and 
American law (with an exception applying to mentally impaired 
persons) but not in France. Naturally, it is unreasonable to hold 
a person liable without conduct which results in the causing of 
harm or loss. In all the above-mentioned jurisdictions, it would 
generally be unreasonable to hold the wrongdoer liable in delict 
or tort law if the omission or commission does not qualify as 
some form of conduct. Thus the influence of reasonableness on 
the element of conduct in all the above-mentioned jurisdictions 
is implicit. 
Keywords 
American law; conduct; commission; delict; English law; French 
law; involuntary; omission; reasonableness; South African law; 
tort; voluntary. 
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1  Introduction 
Much uncertainty about the role of reasonableness has surfaced in the 
South African case law lately, particularly with regard to the elements of 
wrongfulness and fault in determining delictual liability. This has prompted 
me to undertake research in order to ascertain the influence of 
reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability. In previous 
contributions1 the historical development of the concept "reasonableness", 
its definition, its modern uses and its interrelatedness with other 
jurisprudential concepts in the law of delict were discussed. In this 
contribution the influence of reasonableness on the element of conduct2 in 
determining delictual liability in South African law will be analysed and 
compared with the influence of reasonableness on the requirement of some 
form of conduct in English tort law,3 American tort law4 and the French law 
of delict.  
France and the United Kingdom have produced two major legal systems of 
the world, both of which have influenced many other legal systems.5 The 
French Civil Code of 1804 was the basis for civil law in Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Portugal and some African 
countries.6 For this reason, French law, as one of the most influential 
systems in the civil law tradition, is a good choice for comparative research, 
in addition to the law of the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as 
English law) and the law of the United States of America (hereinafter 
referred to as American law). The United States of America and the United 
                                            
 Raheel Ahmed. LLB LLM LLD (UNISA). Admitted Attorney, Conveyancer and Notary 
of the High Court of South Africa. Senior Lecturer, Department of Private Law, 
University of South Africa. E-mail: ahmedr@unisa.ac.za. This contribution is based 
on material taken from various chapters of my LLD thesis The Explicit and Implicit 
Influence of Reasonableness on the Elements of Delictual Liability. Thank you to my 
employer, the University of South Africa, for awarding me the "Academic 
Qualification Improvement Programme" grant. The grant enabled me to research 
English tort law, American tort law and the French law of delict, and to complete the 
thesis. Thank you also to my supervisor Prof JC Knobel for his valuable guidance. 
1  Ahmed 2019a THRHR 257 and Ahmed 2019b THRHR 381. This current contribution 
is the third contribution in a series of contributions based on the influence of 
reasonableness on the elements of delictual liability. 
2  The influence of reasonableness on the other individual elements of delictual liability 
will be discussed further in later contributions still to be published. 
3  The word "tort" is synonymous with the word "delict". The term "English law" here 
refers to the law of the United Kingdom. 
4  The term "American law" here refers to the law of the United States of America. 
5  Van Dam European Tort Law 9. 
6  Van Dam European Tort Law 52; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 5. 
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Kingdom represent the common law family,7 while France represents the 
civil law family.8 Zweigert and Kӧtz9 point out that even though American 
law is based on English law, it has developed its own style and it would be 
a mistake not to include it in a comparative study. The mix of English law 
and American law is commonly referred to as Anglo-American law. This 
term will be used herein when referring to English and American law. This 
choice of jurisdictions should produce insights from a variety of perspectives 
in respect of the influence of reasonableness on the law of delict or tort law.  
It is useful to begin with a brief explanation of the fundamental differences 
and similarities between the legal systems of the above-mentioned 
jurisdictions. Thereafter, the influence of reasonableness on some form of 
conduct in each of these jurisdictions will be analysed. In conclusion the 
similarities and differences between the influences of reasonableness on 
some form of conduct in the jurisdictions will be highlighted. 
2  Fundamental differences and similarities among the 
different legal systems 
In general, English common law has influenced South African law.10 English 
law has also influenced American law. However, since the United States of 
America declared its independence from Britain in 1776, its law has 
undergone change, particularly due to the adoption of a written 
constitution.11 Social and economic development in the United States of 
America has also influenced the development of law.12 
Roman-Dutch law was introduced into South Africa by the Dutch in the 
seventeenth century.13 The South African law of delict is therefore a mix of 
                                            
7  Common law is based on case law that developed over time. Adjudicators refer to 
prior existing decisions. English and American law is based on common law and 
therefore form part of the common law family. See Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to 
Comparative Law 41, 69. 
8  In respect of the civil law tradition, the law ruling the jurisdiction is codified. 
Adjudicators need not refer to prior existing decisions but refer to the codified law. In 
France, the adjudicators refer to the French Civil Code of 1804 (CC) and therefore 
French law, like German law (the Bϋrgerliches Gesetzbuch ‒ the Civil Code of 
Germany) forms part of the civil law family. See Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to 
Comparative Law 69, 74, 143-144. 
9  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 41. 
10  See Hahlo and Khan South African Legal System 575-578. 
11  Constitution of the USA. The Constitution encompasses basis rights which generally 
cannot be infringed by the legislature, the executive or the judiciary. The country also 
has a federal structure. See Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 219, 
239. 
12  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 239. 
13  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 231. 
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English common law and Roman-Dutch law.14 It is for this reason, coupled 
with South Africa's adoption of a written constitution15 and recognition of the 
applicability of South African customary law,16 that South African law is now 
referred to as a hybrid system or mixed jurisdiction.17 
Like Roman law, the common law of torts initially developed with specific 
categories of liability, but on the continent, a general approach in 
determining liability was followed.18 This general approach is followed in 
South African and French law.19 The Anglo-American law kept to the 
tradition of separate torts which was developed under the writ system.20 
Each separate tort is independent, has its own elements, its own possible 
defences, and protects particular interests.21 There are many torts in Anglo-
American law. For example, English law has approximately seventy torts.22 
Due to the fact that Anglo-American law differentiates between many 
intentional torts and the tort of negligence, only the tort of negligence and 
the torts of trespass to the person will be considered.23 The torts of trespass 
to the person include the tort of battery, the tort of assault, and the tort of 
false imprisonment. 
South African, English and American law follow the precedent system due 
to the common law influence on the law of civil procedure.24 Thus, 
adjudicators25 decide on whether a delict or tort was committed, whether a 
defence is applicable in limiting or excluding liability, and the amount of 
compensation that should be awarded to the plaintiff. Constitutions, 
legislation, international treaties and conventions in conjunction with the 
                                            
14  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 231. 
15  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16  Provided it is consistent with the constitutional provisions and has not been affected 
by legislation. See ss 211 and 13(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996; S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) paras 365-383; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Principles of Delict 30 fn 3-5; Himonga and Nhlapo African Customary 
Law 45-46. 
17  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 72, 235. 
18  See Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 605. 
19  As will be shown in this contribution and further contributions. 
20  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 605. 
21  Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 605. 
22  See Koziol "Comparative Conclusions" 697. 
23  The torts of trespass to the person are important intentional torts to consider with 
regard to bodily harm caused intentionally. The torts of trespass to the person were 
also chosen in order to meaningfully compare the influence of reasonableness with 
regard to intentionally inflicted harm or loss in Anglo-American tort law and in the 
South African law of delict. 
24  See Zweigert and Kӧtz Introduction to Comparative Law 232. 
25  In the United States of America, where a jury is appointed it is regarded as the trier 
of facts (Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 36). 
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common law may play roles in determining delictual liability or liability in tort 
law.26 The French law of delict is based primarily on the French Civil Code 
of 1804. The precedent system is not followed in the French law of civil 
procedure. Thus French adjudicators need not refer to prior decisions.27 
Even though Anglo-American law does not follow a generalising approach 
as in South Africa and France, in all these jurisdictions, generally, as will be 
shown below, some form of conduct is required and inferred from the facts 
in order to ground liability in delict or tort law. 
South African, English and American law generally refer to 
"reasonableness" in considering a number of elements of delictual or tort 
liability. In France the concept is not explicitly referred to but the concepts 
of solidarity, liberty and equality are.28 "Reasonableness" is considered 
implicitly, however, where other terms or phrases reflecting reasonableness 
values or standards are used. Fletcher29 correctly points out that while 
jurisdictions following common law such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America easily refer to the concept "reasonableness", other 
jurisdictions (like France) rarely do, but that does not mean that lawyers of 
the different jurisdictions think differently. It just means that they speak 
differently.  
3  The influence of reasonableness on the element of 
conduct in the South African law of delict  
Conduct is defined as a "voluntary human act or omission".30 From this 
definition it is apparent that conduct may be in the form of an omission (a 
failure to act) or a commission (a positive, physical act or statement).31 The 
act or omission generally must have been committed by a human being32 
                                            
26  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 3 with reference to American 
law. 
27  See Borghetti 2012 JETL 180; Van Dam European Tort Law 55. 
28  The main aim of the CC is to affirm liberty, equality and fraternity (Van Dam 
European Tort Law 51). 
29  Fletcher 1985 Harv L Rev 949-953. 
30  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 95. 
31  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 92; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 
95; Burchell Principles of Delict 37. 
32  In instances where a human being uses an animal as an instrument to commit a 
delict, such conduct will be considered a human act, qui facit per alium facit per se - 
he who acts through another commits the act himself (Burchell Principles of Delict 
37). See Jooste v Minister of Police 1975 1 SA 349 (E) 354, where Addleson J 
referred to instances where the police make use of dogs just as they use "other 
suitable and appropriate instruments". In this case a police dog bit and injured a boy 
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or a juristic person such as a close corporation or company,33 and the act 
must be voluntary.34 
Voluntariness refers to the person's mental ability to control his muscular 
movements.35 A person's conduct need not be reasonable or desired in 
order to be voluntary.36 There are certain recognised conditions which may 
result in an act’s being regarded as involuntary. For example, absolute 
compulsion,37 being unconsciousness or in a state of sleep,38 extreme 
intoxication,39 reflex muscular movements, black-outs,40 fits,41 severe 
emotional pressure,42 heart attacks,43 hypnosis, and mental impairments,44 
are all regarded as conditions which may render one's actions involuntary 
while in such condition.45 Automatism in South African law is the well-known 
defence which refutes the imputation that an act or omission was 
voluntary.46 The defence of automatism will not succeed if the defendant 
negligently or intentionally created the situation in which he claims to have 
                                            
in the course of an arrest. The court found that the circumstances did not call for the 
use of the dog, which was not justified. The court awarded damages to the boy's 
father, in his capacity as father and natural guardian, for the harm suffered by the 
son. Also see Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Principles of Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
33  Which can be held delictually liable through the actions of its organs, who are people. 
See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25-26; Van der Walt and Midgley 
Principles of Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
34  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 90-91; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
35  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 26; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
36  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 26; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
37  See S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A). 
38  See R v Dhlamini 1955 1 SA 120 (T). 
39  See S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A). If a person consumes alcohol while foreseeing 
that he might drive a motor vehicle later on, his conduct will still be considered 
voluntary even though at the time of the accident he was so inebriated that his 
actions were in actual fact involuntary. See Visser "Compensation for Pecuniary 
Loss" 1096. 
40  See Government v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1973 3 SA 797 (D); Molefe 
v Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA). 
41  See R v Mkize 1959 2 SA 260 (N). 
42  See S v Arnold 1985 3 SA 256 (C). 
43  See Gabellone v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O). 
44  See S v Mahlinza 1967 1 SA 408 (A). Conduct by a person living with a mental 
disability or an infant is generally voluntary, but such person may not be held 
delictually liable due to the exclusion of fault or lack of accountability. See Neethling 
and Potgieter Law of Delict 26; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 90-91; 
Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96-97. 
45  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 27; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 97; 
Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 91; Burchell Principles of Delict 23. 
46  See Government v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1973 3 SA 797 (D) 799; 
Molefe v Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA); Ahmed "Influence of Reasonableness" 50 
and the authority cited therein. 
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behaved involuntarily.47 With regard to the alleged negligent conduct of the 
defendant, what must be determined "is whether the reasonable person in 
the position of the defendant would have foreseen the possibility of the 
ensuing harm while in a state of automatism and would have prevented 
such harm".48 For example, if a defendant who is prone to epileptic fits 
forgets to take his medication one morning and it later transpires that he 
suffered an epileptic fit while driving, thereby causing an accident,49 he 
cannot rely on automatism. The courts take into account the defendant's 
conduct prior to the state of automatism.50 A reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant would have taken his medication, thus preventing 
the occurrence of a fit which resulted in the ensuing harm.51 In trying to 
                                            
47   Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 28-29; Ahmed "Influence of 
Reasonableness" 50. 
48  This question brings us to the element of fault and effectively another incidence of 
conduct - that is the omission to take prescribed medication. See Ahmed "Influence 
of Reasonableness" 50. See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 28; Van der Walt 
and Midgley Principles of Delict 91; Burchell Principles of Delict 36-37. 
49  Which resulted in the injury of an innocent victim. 
50  Gabellone v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O) 173-174. Van der Merwe and 
Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid- Afrikaanse Reg 26-29 submit that 
automatism does not exclude conduct, but rather wrongfulness or fault. Their view 
may be illustrated with reference to the example in the text above in that the actual 
conduct which led to the accident was not voluntary, but there were prior voluntary 
acts (or, in the example, an omission to take medication) which caused the innocent 
victim's injury. They submit that the conduct was voluntary but that fault is absent, 
resulting in no delictual liability. Neethling and Potgieter (Law of Delict 29) admit that 
this view may be theoretically correct, but criticise it on the ground that it conforms 
to a narrow view of automatism, and also that the plaintiff may have difficulty in 
proving negligence. The latter authors are of the view that one must look at the act 
which caused the harm (not the prior acts) and if it is involuntary then there is no 
"conduct". If, however, the defendant knew or should have reasonably foreseen that 
his omission could cause harm, he will not be able to rely on automatism because 
his liability will be based on his prior conduct. 
51  See Molefe v Mahaeng 1999 1 SA 562 (SCA), where the defendant suffered a 
blackout raising automatism as a defence and succeeded. Even though the 
defendant had slipped and fallen earlier on  the day of the accident, the court 
held that there was a lack of evidence in proving that the reasonable person should 
have been aware of the possibility of a blackout as a result of the fall earlier that day 
(569). In this case, the court followed a similar approach to that in English law (with 
regard to the tort of negligence), where the standard applied is the "reasonable 
person" and fault in the form of negligence is absent. English tort doctrine generally 
does not differentiate between the element of conduct and fault. See Mansfield v 
Weetabix 1988 1 WLR 1263 (CA). Mullender 2005 MLR 688, however, with regard 
to Anglo-American law agrees that in such instances the defendant does not act. In 
Wessels v Hall and Pickles (Coastal) (Pty) Ltd 1985 4 SA 153 (C) 158, the defendant 
suffered a hypoglycaemic attack resulting in a diabetic coma while driving and 
causing an accident. The court held that the defendant was negligent for failing to 
take precautions by eating a mid-morning snack in his insulin-dependent diabetic 
condition. The reasonable person would have foreseen the possibility that if he 
missed his mid-morning snack, his blood sugar level might have dropped 
unexpectedly, thereby causing him to lose control of the vehicle. But see Gabellone 
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ascertain whether the conduct was voluntary, the courts consider the 
conduct, prior to the state of automatism, of the hypothetical reasonable 
person in a position similar to that of the defendant. This relates to 
negligence.52 Similarly, with reference to the example above, intentional 
conduct may be considered. Thus, if the defendant intentionally and 
deliberately does not take his medication one morning, leading to him 
suffering an epileptic fit while driving, thereby causing an accident, it is 
doubtful that he will be able to rely on automatism. The doctrine actio libera 
in causa53 may be applied and the defendant may be held liable for any 
harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff.54  
The influence of reasonableness on conduct is implicit.55 It is in principle 
reasonable to hold a defendant liable in delict only if the element of conduct 
is present with all the other required elements.56 It is reasonable to hold a 
person liable in South African law only if the voluntary conduct was present 
in the form of an act or omission and was undertaken by a human being.57 
Naturally, if the conduct was not undertaken by a human being or was 
involuntary, then it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable, as there is 
no conduct.58 In cases where an animal is used as an instrument by a 
human being to commit a delict, then it may be deemed a human act, as the 
human being is in control of the animal.59 In a similar vein, conduct by a 
natural person acting as an organ of a juristic person may be deemed 
                                            
v Protea Assurance Ltd 1981 4 SA 171 (O) 173-174, where the driver suffered from 
coronary thrombosis prior to his death and subsequently suffered a cardiac 
disturbance which affected his ability to control the vehicle he was driving shortly 
before the accident. The court held that what happened thereafter was "not due to 
any voluntary action or inaction on his part." Edeling AJ found that on the balance of 
probabilities the (deceased) driver, at the time of the accident, suffered a heart attack 
which was not due to his negligence (174). Also see Neethling and Potgieter Law of 
Delict 28-29; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley 
Law of Delict 98. 
52  Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 98-99; Ahmed "Influence of Reasonableness" 50. 
53  The wrongdoing he commits can be imputed to him for actions unfree in themselves, 
but free in their causes. 
54  Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 28; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 91; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 97. 
55  Ahmed "Influence of Reasonableness" 50. 
56  Ahmed "Influence of Reasonableness" 50. 
57  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles 
of Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 95. 
58  Except in instances where the actio de pastu and the actio de pauperie are 
applicable. See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 381-385. 
59  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles 
of Delict 90; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
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human conduct and it may be reasonable to hold the defendant liable, 
provided all the other elements of a delict are present too.60 
Generally, in determining whether conduct is present the adjudicator will 
consider the facts of the case. It is predominantly a factual enquiry. 
However, in the requirement that the conduct must be voluntary, normative 
elements become more prominent. In principle, if the conduct is voluntary, 
then conduct may be present and it is reasonable to hold the defendant 
liable in delict, providing all the other elements are proved. In respect of the 
defence of automatism, it may be argued that it is reasonable for the 
defence to apply, if the person was mentally unable to control his muscular 
movements. Thus, if the defendant was mentally able to control his 
muscular movements then in principle his conduct may be considered 
voluntary, the defence of automatism will not be applicable, and it is 
reasonable to hold the defendant delictually liable. As already stated, 
automatism will not succeed if the defendant's prior intentional or negligent 
conduct led to the involuntary bodily movements which resulted in harm to 
the plaintiff. It would thus be unreasonable for automatism to succeed as a 
defence to the element of conduct if the defendant's prior negligent or 
intentional conduct led to the subsequent involuntary bodily movements 
which resulted in harm to the plaintiff.  
4  The influence of reasonableness on conduct in English 
law  
4.1  The intentional torts of trespass61 to the person 
The general requirements for trespass to the person are direct,62 positive, 
intentional conduct,63 resulting in immediate harm, but damage need not be 
                                            
60  See Neethling and Potgieter Law of Delict 25; Van der Walt and Midgley Principles 
of Delict 90-91; Loubser and Midgley Law of Delict 96. 
61  Trespass in short refers to a specific wrong (Steele Tort Law 39). 
62  See Sterman v EW & W J Moore Ltd 1970 1 QB 596. An example of "directness" 
with regard to battery is a blow to the face. With regard to assault (where physical 
contact is not required) threatening telephone calls will fall under "directness" and 
with regard to false imprisonment, physical arrest by the police will be 
considered as "direct". Also see Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 
56; Witting Street on Torts 251, 256-257.  
63  Initially intention was not required, but after Fowler v Lanning 1959 1 QB 426 and 
Letang v Cooper  1965 1 QB 232 (dealing with battery), it is clear that in trespass to 
the person, intention also including "subjective recklessness" is required (Peel and 
Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 56-57). It has been argued that it has not 
yet been ruled out that liability in the tort of trespass to the person may stem from 
negligent conduct – see Weaver v Ward 1617 80 ER 284 and Scott v Shepherd 1773 
96 ER 525. It is important to note that in English law harm is required in the tort of 
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proven.64 With regard to trespass to the person, the aim is to protect the 
claimant's legally recognised interest in his person from wrongful 
interference by the defendant which may lead to compensation.65 Thus 
interference with a person may take place in the form of battery, assault, 
and false imprisonment.66 
4.1.1  Battery67 
Battery is an act by the "defendant that directly and intentionally" causes 
harm to the claimant through some kind of unlawful, non-consensual, 
undesired, physical contact.68 According to the requirements, there must be 
direct, physical, "hostile"69 contact which is not consented to.70 Bodily 
contact will not be considered hostile if it conforms to the ordinary, generally 
acceptable contact that occurs in everyday life, such as brushing against 
someone in a crowded corridor.71 There must be a voluntary,72 intentional, 
                                            
negligence while it is not important in trespass to a person. Furthermore, there are 
different prescription periods with regard to claims in trespass and negligence. Cf 
Murphy "Trespass to the Person" 1093; Witting Street on Torts 251-254; Giliker Tort 
409; McBride and Bagshaw Tort Law 42-45; Steele Tort Law 40-47; Lunney, Nolan 
and Oliphant Tort Law 43-53. 
64  The tort is actionable per se. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 
57; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 359; Giliker 
Tort 409. 
65  Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 360; Giliker Tort 
409. 
66  Murphy "Trespass to the Person" 1092. 
67  Usually referred to as assault in other jurisdictions (Giliker Tort 414). 
68  See Witting Street on Torts 249. Cf Murphy "Trespass to the Person" 1092; Deakin, 
Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 362; Steele Tort Law 
33. 
69  This was enunciated in Wilson v Pringle 1987 QB 237, but really refers to some kind 
of "offensive" conduct as submitted by Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz 
on Tort 60. Cf Witting Street on Torts 254 who refers to conduct that "the claimant 
might object to, something that the claimant might regard as an unlawful intrusion on 
his rights to physical integrity". Lord Goff in F v West Berkshire HA 1990 2 AC 1, 73 
did not approve of the correctness of the use of term "hostile". Cf McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort Law 43-44; Lunney, Nolan and Oliphant Tort Law 53-56. 
70  Whether or not there was consent will be determined objectively. The claimant must 
prove that he did not consent (Frieman v Home Office (No 2) 1983 All ER 589, 594-
595). See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 61; Murphy "Trespass 
to the Person" 1143; Witting Street on Torts 255. 
71  See Collins v Wilcock 1984 1 WLR 1172, 1178-1179; F v West Berkshire Health 
Authority 1989 2 All ER 545, 564; Wainwright v Home Office 2004 2 AC 406, 417; 
Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 58-59, 60 fn 35; Murphy 
"Trespass to the Person" 1096; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and 
Deakin's Tort Law 362-363; Witting Street on Torts 254, 72-73; Giliker Tort 413; 
Steele Tort Law 47-49. 
72  McBride and Bagshaw Tort Law 38-39. 
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positive act by the defendant73 and the consequences need not be 
foreseeable.74  
For example, in Morris v Marsden75 the defendant (a schizophrenic) 
attacked the defendant and claimed that because of his condition he did not 
understand the consequences of his conduct. The defendant was found 
liable in the tort of battery as his actions were voluntary at the time the tort 
was committed. Stable J76 stated that if a person was in a complete state of 
automatism, which is in English law acting without fault in causing the harm, 
then he will not be held liable.77  
The influence of reasonableness is implicit on voluntariness. In principle, if 
the defendant's conduct is involuntary then an element may be absent or a 
defence to battery may be applicable. The conduct required is direct, 
physical, unlawful, non-consensual contact. If a person is reasonably 
expected to endure the direct, physical, voluntary contact or if the contact is 
inconsequential then there is no battery. 
4.1.2  Assault 
Assault is a positive act by the defendant that intentionally and directly 
"causes the claimant reasonably to apprehend the imminent infliction of 
battery".78 Thus there must be voluntary conduct (on the part of the 
defendant) which leads to the claimant's fear or reasonable anticipation of 
imminent, unlawful violence by the defendant.79 Actual physical contact is 
not required. Thus if X points a gun at Y and misses the shot at Y, then X 
has committed assault, but if Y gets shot then it is battery.80  
Inciting words are usually not considered as assault, but in R v Ireland81 the 
House of Lords held that verbal threats received telephonically leading the 
plaintiff to reasonably believe that the threats would be carried out 
                                            
73  Obstructing an entrance or standing in a person's way is not sufficient. See Witting 
Street on Torts 255-256. 
74  See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 58; Murphy "Trespass to the 
Person" 1094; Giliker Tort 412. 
75  Morris v Marsden 1952 All ER 925. 
76  Morris v Marsden 1952 All ER 925, 927. 
77  Witting Street on Torts 659. 
78  See Collins v Wilcock 1984 1 WLR 1172, 1178, Witting Street on Torts 249; Murphy 
"Trespass to the Person" 1092; Steele Tort Law 35; Lunney, Nolan and Oliphant Tort 
Law 49. 
79  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 359, 361. 
80  See Giliker Tort 414. 
81  R v Ireland 1998 AC 147. Even though this was a criminal case, the reasoning may 
be applied to assault as a tort. 
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immediately qualified as an assault.82 In Read v Cocker83 the defendant was 
found liable for assault when he made a gesture and threatened to break 
the plaintiff's neck if he did not leave the shop.84 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirement of some form of 
voluntary, positive conduct on the part of the defendant which leads to the 
claimant's reasonable apprehension of imminent battery is explicit. It would 
also be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for involuntary conduct. 
Furthermore, if conduct on the part of the defendant is absent, then there is 
no tort and it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable.  
4.1.3  False imprisonment  
False imprisonment refers to the act of the defendant who intentionally and 
directly "causes the claimant's confinement within an area delimited by the 
defendant".85 The conduct must usually consist of a voluntary, positive act,86 
and must be intentional,87 direct and immediate.88 
The influence of reasonableness is implicit on the requirement of positive 
conduct on the part of the defendant that leads to the confinement of the 
plaintiff. It would be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable if there was 
                                            
82  R v Ireland 1998 AC 147, 162. See Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on 
Tort 65; Witting Street on Torts 258-259; Lunney, Nolan and Oliphant Tort Law 50-
53. 
83  Read v Cocker 138 ER 1437. 
84  See McBride and Bagshaw Tort Law 40; Giliker Tort 416. 
85  Confinement need not be limited to a prison cell or room. See Murphy "Trespass to 
the Person" 1092, 1104; Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's 
Tort Law 370; Witting Street on Torts 249, 264. 
86  For example, if the public authority omits to release a claimant, it will not necessarily 
amount to false  imprisonment unless the claimant has the right to be released and 
the defendant is obliged to release the claimant. See Iqbal v Prison Officers 
Association 2010 QB 732, where the prison warders went on strike and did not 
release the claimant at the time the strike was going on. At the time, the Governor 
ordered that the prisoners remain in their cells throughout the day while the strike 
was going on. A failure by the prison warders to turn up to work did not lead to liability 
for false imprisonment. However, a deliberate dishonest refusal might lead to a 
claim for (omission)  misfeasance in public office (per Lord Neuberger MR 
paras 40-42). In Roberts v Chief Constable of the Cheshire Constabulary 1999 WLR 
662, the claimant was arrested on suspicion of burglary and detained without review 
for over two hours longer than the period authorised by the statute. His detention of
 approximately 2 hours 20 minutes was considered unlawful and he was found to 
have been falsely imprisoned for that time. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis 
Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 372; Witting Street on Torts 269; McBride and 
Bagshaw Tort Law 41, 59; Giliker Tort 416; Steele Tort Law 63-64. 
87  See Iqbal v Prison Officers Association 2010 QB 732 para 72; McBride and Bagshaw 
Tort Law 45. 
88  Giliker Tort 417. 
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no voluntary, intentional, positive act on the part of the defendant which 
leads to the confinement of the plaintiff. 
4.2  The tort of negligence 
In the tort of negligence,89 the criterion applied is the reasonable person 
standard. It has been held that the reasonable person may have certain 
conditions such as a condition leading to a heart attack,90 and that such a 
person who is unaware of his condition cannot be held liable for the harm 
he caused as a result of the condition.91 
It is evident that English law, in a sense, has influenced South African law, 
as an approach similar to that in English law has been followed in 
determining whether there was any prior fault-related voluntary conduct. 
English tort law refers to the reasonable person as the hypothetical ordinary 
person who may have a condition such as a heart attack leading to 
mechanical acts (where there was no prior fault-related act) causing harm. 
In such instances there is no fault and therefore no liability in the tort of 
negligence. In the South African law of delict, conduct would be absent as 
the conduct is involuntary, as well as fault, providing there was no prior fault-
related voluntary conduct which led to the subsequent involuntary act. 
It is apparent that in English law the defence of automatism (that is, acting 
without fault) is therefore applicable in the tort of negligence and the 
intentional torts. It is unreasonable for the defence of automatism to apply 
where prior negligent or intentional voluntary acts subsequently lead to 
involuntary acts resulting in harm to another. Thus, it is reasonable for the 
defence of automatism to apply if there were no prior negligent or intentional 
acts leading to involuntary conduct causing harm. 
A person who is unaware of his condition and, for example, suffers a heart 
attack which leads to mechanical movements resulting in harm or loss, may 
not reasonably be held to have capacity or be liable in the tort of negligence. 
Capacity "refers to the status of legal persons and their ability to sue or be 
sued in tort".92 
                                            
89  The tort of negligence will be discussed in more detail in later contributions still to be 
published (see fn 1). 
90  See Waugh v James K Allen Ltd 1964 2 Lloyd's Rep 1; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield 
and Jolowicz on Tort 779. 
91  See Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd 1998 1 WLR 1263; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and 
Jolowicz on Tort 779; see para 3 above, where a similar approach has been applied 
in South African law where a person suffered a heart attack. 
92  Witting Street on Torts 651. 
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With regard to the tort of negligence, conduct is not explicitly referred to as 
a requirement but some form of conduct is required, that is in the form of an 
omission, a failure to act, in order to ground liability.93 In Anglo-American 
law the term "misfeasance" refers to affirmative or positive action, 
synonymous with the term "commission" used in South African law, while 
"nonfeasance" refers to a failure to act94 and is synonymous with the term 
"omission" used in South African Law. As stated above95 the conduct must 
be voluntary, whether one is dealing with an intentional tort or the tort of 
negligence. The tort of negligence specifically deals with negligently inflicted 
harm.96 It protects a number of interests and focusses on the conduct of the 
defendant and whether the defendant acted unreasonably in causing the 
plaintiff's harm or loss.97 
In English law, under the tort of negligence "omissions" are recognised as 
a specific category of the duty of care. This category of duty will be 
discussed in detail in a future contribution as it deals more with the other 
elements of a tort than with the requirement of conduct.98 For the purposes 
of this contribution it is sufficient to point out that conduct in the form of an 
omission is required when determining liability in the tort of negligence. 
Thus, in respect of negligence a failure to act may lead to liability in the tort 
of negligence, provided all the other elements are also present. 
In South African law, conduct in the form of an omission is still regarded as 
conduct which may lead to liability in delict if the remaining elements 
required are also present.99 The influence of reasonableness on some form 
of conduct in English law is implicit in that it is unreasonable to hold a person 
liable under the tort of negligence if there was a failure to act/nonfeasance. 
                                            
93  The elements required for the tort of negligence are duty, breach, causation and 
damage. See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 
99. Cf Jones "Negligence" 441; Peel and Goudkamp Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 
78; Witting Street on Torts 25; Steele Tort Law 112. The influence of reasonableness 
on the other elements of the tort of negligence will be discussed further in later 
contributions still to be published (see fn 1). In this contribution the focus is on some 
form of conduct. 
94  See Deakin, Johnston and Markesinis Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law 178; Witting 
Street on Torts 40; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 374. 
95  In paras 4.1.1-4.1.3 above. 
96  However, negligently inflicted harm does not always result in liability in negligence. 
For example, negligent conduct with respect to the use of land could result in 
nuisance liability (Witting Street on Torts 26). 
97  McBride and Bagshaw Tort Law 95. 
98  See fn 1. 
99  See para 3 above. 
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5  The influence of reasonableness on conduct in American 
law  
5.1  The intentional torts of trespass to the person 
Generally, the torts of trespass to a person require some kind of positive, 
physical act.100 The torts are actionable per se. That is, proof of physical 
harm is not required (in contrast to the tort of negligence where proof of 
harm is required) and the plaintiff is in principle entitled to damages.101 
5.1.1  Battery  
According to the requirements, there must be an intentional positive 
(affirmative) act,102 resulting in harm or offense to the plaintiff or another that 
is not privileged or consented to.103 In terms of the act, such an act must be 
voluntary.104 Involuntary acts such as muscle spasms, fits and so forth do 
not qualify as acts.105 However, an instinctive response to an emergency 
such as grabbing a person's arm or striking a person out of "insane 
impulses"106 constitutes an act. Contact or touch must be substantial or 
significant and it is interpreted widely. For example, contact is present where 
a person drinks poison placed in a cup,107 is exposed to dangerous 
fumes,108 or radiation, or smoke from tobacco, provided there is a "purpose 
                                            
100  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 54. 
101  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 54. 
102  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 13 (1965); 
American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2015 § 101cmt c; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 68-69; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law 
of Torts 41. The Restatement of Torts is an extensive, successive body of work 
produced by the American Law Institute that is aimed at gathering and combining 
black letter law applied throughout the different states. The volumes include case 
law, restate existing common law, and provide guidance on what the rule of law 
should be to the legal community. Although the Restatements are not binding on the 
courts, they are regarded as  authoritative and are often referred to in 
judgments (Zweigert and Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law 41, 251). The First, 
Second or Third Restatement of Torts may be referred to in order to show similarities 
or changes between the volumes which are often highlighted by American academic 
writers. 
103  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 13; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 62-64. 
104  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 2. 
105  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 34-35. 
106  Poltmatier v Russ 537 A 2d 468 (1988); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
Torts 68. 
107  Snouffer v Snouffer 621 NE 2d 879 (Ohio Ct App 1933). See Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on Torts 67. 
108  Swope v Columbian Chems Co 281 F 3d 185 (5th Cir 2002). See Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 67 fn 95. 
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to harm or offend" on the part of the defendant.109 Examples of battery 
include instances where the defendant shoots or beats a spouse; 110 spits 
on the plaintiff's face;111 pushes the plaintiff aggressively even though the 
plaintiff is not physically harmed;112 kisses the plaintiff without consent;113 
touches the plaintiff's clothing,114 body115 or hair when not wanted to do 
so;116 snatches an object from the plaintiff's hand;117 intentionally pulls a 
chair from underneath the plaintiff as she is about to sit resulting in her falling 
to the floor;118 and where the defendant provides medical treatment which 
involves physical contact without consent, even if the treatment was 
intended to save the patient's life.119 
The influence of reasonableness on conduct in the tort of battery is implicit. 
There must be positive conduct on the part of the defendant in the form of 
touching or contact with the plaintiff. Contact is interpreted widely and may 
occur directly or indirectly. The conduct must be voluntary. That is, the 
defendant must be able to mentally control his muscular movements when 
there is contact with the plaintiff. Thus, if the conduct is involuntary then 
there is no act and it is unreasonable to hold the defendant liable. If the 
contact is accidental then intention is absent and it is unreasonable to hold 
                                            
109  Field v Philadelphia Elec Co 388 Pa Super 400, 417, 565 A 2d 1170, 1178 (1989). 
110  Noble v Noble 761 P 2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Cain v McKinnon 552 So 2d 91 (Miss 
1989); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 61. 
111  See Draper v Baker 61 Wis 450, 21 NW 527 (1884); Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 41. 
112  Whitley v Anderson 37 Colo App 486, 551 P 2d 1083 (1976), aff'd, 194 Colo 87, 570 
P 2d 525 (1977); Selmeczki v New Mexico Dep't of Corrections 139 NM 122, 129 P 
3d 158 (Ct App 2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 61-62. 
113  Johnson v Ramsey County, 424 NW 2d 800 (Minn Ct App 1988); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 61 fn 54. 
114  Piggly-Wiggly Alabama Co v Rickles 1925 212 Ala 585, 103 So 860, where there 
was an attempted search of the plaintiff's pockets. See Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts 39. 
115  Stockett v Tolin 791 F Supp 1536 (SD Fla 1992), where the employer touched the 
employee's breast and licked her; White v University of Idaho 797 P 2d 108, 109 
(Idaho 1990), where the piano teacher touched the plaintiff's back as if lifting his 
fingers on and off the piano; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 62 fn 
62. 
116  Rogers v Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel 526 F Supp 523 (DDC 1981); Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 61 fn 54. 
117  See Fisher v Carrousel Motor Hotel Inc Tex (1967) 424 SW 2d 627, 629-630 where 
a plate was snatched from the plaintiff's hand; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts 40. 
118  Garratt v Dailey 46 Wash 2d 197, 279 P 2d 1091 (1995); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 68. 
119  See Taylor v Johnston 985 P 2d 460 (Alaska 1999); Mims v Boland 110 Ga App 477, 
138 SE 2d 902 (1964); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 61 fn 55. 
R AHMED  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  17 
the defendant liable for battery. The tort of negligence may, however, be 
applicable. 
5.1.2  Assault 
Assault usually occurs before battery, and is "an act that is intended to and 
does place the plaintiff in apprehension of an immediate unconsented-to 
touching that would amount to a battery".120 The Restatement Second of 
Torts refers to "apprehension"121 while the Restatement Third of Torts refers 
to "anticipation".122 The courts sometimes refer to "fear".123 Subjective 
anticipation or apprehension of harm is required on the part of the plaintiff.124 
A claim for assault (as in English law) is based on the lack of physical 
contact or harm. Thus, if there is physical contact then it may be regarded 
as a battery.125 The plaintiff must be aware of the impending harm.126 
Without such awareness there is no assault, but if the plaintiff is 
subsequently harmed then there may be a battery.127  
An example of assault occurs where the defendant intends to scare the 
plaintiff by shooting at him but not intending for the bullet to strike him. In 
Raess v Doescher,128 even though there was no attempt to strike the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff's belief in an imminent strike was reasonable, 
considering that the defendant "aggressively and rapidly advanced on the 
plaintiff with clenched fists, piercing eyes, beet-red face, popping veins", 
                                            
120  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 69. 
121  American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 21 and § 32. 
122  American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2015 §105; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on Torts 69. 
123  See Lamb v State 93 Md App 422, 438, 613 A 2d 402, 409 (1993); American Law 
Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2015 §105 illus 1; American Law Institute 
Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 24 cmt B and illus 1 and 2; Dobbs, Hayden 
and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 70-71. 
124  See Chavez v Thomas & Betts Corp 396 F 3d 1088, 1101 (10th Cir 2005), where 
comments on the plaintiff's bra followed by a physical touching and reaching over to 
open her shirt could easily be deemed as apprehension of imminent battery. See 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 69; Shapo Principles of Tort Law 30 
fn 7. 
125  See Bowie v Murphy 271 Va 127, 624 SE 2d 74 (2006); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 69-70. 
126  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 22; Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 44. 
127  See McCraney v Flanagan 47 NC App 498, 267 SE 2d 404 (1980), where the plaintiff 
awoke and found that the defendant had had sexual intercourse with her. Due to the 
fact that she had been unaware of the imminent sexual assault, she had not been 
assaulted. 
128  Raess v Doescher 883 NE 2d 790 (Ind 2008). See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 72. 
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screamed, swore at him, and backed him up against a wall.129 If the plaintiff 
anticipates an imminent battery then there is an assault.130 Other examples 
of assault include shaking a fist under the plaintiff's nose,131 aiming a 
weapon at a person,132 and chasing a person with intent to harm.133 
It was previously thought that words without actual physical conduct do not 
constitute assault,134 however, words are now considered in context and 
may, depending on the circumstances, constitute "assault".135 For example, 
in Cullison v Medley136 the defendants entered the plaintiff's home one 
evening after he retired to bed. They accused and berated him while one of 
the defendant's repeatedly slapped at a gun which was in a holster on his 
thigh but did not draw it. The court found that in the light of all the facts, 
there was an assault.137 
The influence of reasonableness on assault is implicit. The conduct must be 
in the form of an intentional, voluntary, positive act. Through his actions or 
words the defendant must cause the plaintiff to subjectively fear, anticipate 
or apprehend an immediate, direct, unjustified battery. It would be 
unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for conduct which is not deemed 
voluntary. Furthermore, if conduct on the part of the defendant is absent, 
then no tort has been committed. 
5.1.3  False imprisonment 
False imprisonment infringes on the plaintiff's freedom of movement, and 
such a restriction of movement by the defendant may occur in a direct or 
                                            
129  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 72. 
130  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 70. 
131  See Stockwell v Gee 1926 121 Okl 207, 249 P 389; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 43. 
132  See Holdorf v Holdorf 1918 185 Iowa 838, 169 NW 737 (threatening with a club); 
Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 43. 
133  See Townsdin v Nutt 1877 19 Kan 282, where the defendant rode towards the 
plaintiff intending to run her down; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts 43. 
134  Webbier v Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau Inc 105 RI 605, 614, 254 A 2d 
285, 290 (1969). 
135  See Muslow v AG Edwards & Sons Inc 509 So 2d 1012, 1021 (La Ct App 1987); 
Johnson v Bollinger 86 NC App 1, 356 SE 2d 378 (1987); American Law Institute 
Restatement Third of Torts 2015 §105 cmt g; American Law Institute Restatement 
Second of Torts 1965 § 31; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 71. 
136  Cullison v Medley 570 NE 2d 27 (Ind 1991). 
137  See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 71 fn 131. 
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indirect manner.138 The defendant must intend139 to confine (detain or 
restrain)140 or instigate the confinement of the plaintiff against the plaintiff’s 
will.141 False arrest is similar to false imprisonment except that in false 
arrest, the arrest is executed by an officer or a person authorised to make 
an arrest.142 Confinement for even the shortest period of time is sufficient.143 
Arrest, threats, duress or physical force may be used to confine a person.144  
Examples of false imprisonment include a patient’s being held against his 
will at an institute for substance abuse,145 the driver of a motor vehicle not 
allowing a passenger to get out of the vehicle,146 and a police officer 
detaining the plaintiff without a warrant or "probable cause". 
The influence of reasonableness on the requirement of a positive voluntary 
act leading to the confinement of the plaintiff is implicit. The restriction of the 
plaintiff's freedom of movement may be caused directly or indirectly. The 
conduct must be in the form of the voluntary, intentional, confinement of the 
plaintiff, or it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant liable for this tort. 
Furthermore, without the positive act on the part of the defendant of causing 
the confinement of the plaintiff, there is no tort of false imprisonment.  
5.2  The tort of negligence  
In American law, as in English law, conduct is not referred to as a specific 
requirement, but conduct in the form of an omission/nonfeasance is 
required. 
In American law, as in English law, in instances where a person is 
"reasonably unaware" of his own disability or physical limitation, such as 
                                            
138  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 77. Cf Keeton et al Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts 47. 
139  Accidental confinement by the defendant is not construed as intentional 
confinement. See Adams v Wal-Mart Stores Inc 324 F 3d 935, 941 (7th Cir 2003); 
Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 73 fn 150. 
140  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 35, where all these 
terms may be used with regard to false imprisonment. 
141  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 47, 52-53. 
142  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 73. 
143  See Strain v Irwin 1915 195 Ala 414, 70 So 734; Fuerschbach v Southwest Airlines 
Co 439 F 3d 1197 (10th Cir 2006) 1208; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on 
Torts 74; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 48. 
144  See American Law Institute Restatement Second of Torts 1965 §§ 40 and 41. 
145  See Collins v Straight Inc 748 F 2d 916 (4th Cir 1984); Geddes v Daughters of Charity 
of St Vincent de Paul Inc 348 F 2d 144 (5th Cir 1965); authority cited by Dobbs, 
Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 74 fn 164. 
146  See Noguchi v Nakamura 2 Haw App 655, 638 P 2d 1383 (1982); Sindle v New York 
City Transit Auth 33 NYS 2d 183, 307 NE 2d 245 (1973); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 74. 
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where a person suffers a heart attack and was not aware of his condition, 
even though there is conduct he may not be held liable because the heart 
attack was unforeseeable.147 The same applies where a person sustains a 
stroke or an epileptic fit, or faints.148 A person who is aware of his condition, 
disability or physical impairment, or can reasonably foresee that he is prone 
to such impairment, such as a person prone to seizures, may be held 
negligent for not controlling the seizures.149 
A person who voluntarily consumes alcohol150 is still judged according to 
the standard of the sober, reasonable person.151 The reason for this is that 
it would be common for a defendant to raise the excuse of intoxication. 
Drunkenness is not encouraged in society, and a person who consumes 
alcohol should be held accountable for the consequences of consuming 
alcohol and causing harm.152 
A mental impairment, incapacity or disability will generally not lead to the 
exclusion of liability in the tort of negligence or the intentional torts.153 
Keeton et al154 point out that this was the way the law developed and the 
person with a mental impairment or insane person is still judged according 
                                            
147  See Baker v Joyal 4 AD 3d 596, 771 NYS 2d 269 (2004); Hancock-Underwood v 
Knight 670 SE 2d 720 (Va 2009); American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 
2010; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 224. 
148  See Moore v Preenell 1977 38 Md App 243, 379 A 2d 1246 and Frechette v Welch 
(1st Cir 1980) 621 F 2d 11 (with regard to an unforeseeable blackout); Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 162. 
149  See Goodrich v Blair 132 Ariz 459, 646 P 2d 890 (1982), where a driver was prone 
to heart attacks; Lutzkovitz v Murray 339 A 2d 64, 93 ALR 3d 321 (Del 1975) in 
respect of the risk of having blackouts; Howle v PYA/Monarch Inc 288 SC 586, 344 
SE 2d 157 (1986) in respect of fatigue and drowsiness due to insulin resistance. 
Thus, where the defendant is aware of his condition and continues to drive or operate 
machinery thereafter causing an accident or harm, then such a person's conduct is 
considered unreasonable. See Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 225 
fn 157-159. 
150  A person who is involuntarily intoxicated is not judged according to the reasonable 
person standard. See Davies v Butler 95 Nev 763, 602 P 2d 605 (1979); American 
Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 12 cmt c; Dobbs, Hayden and 
Bublick Hornbook on Torts 231 fn 209.  
151  See for example, Hamilton v Kinsey Ala 1976 337 So 2d 344; Haber v County of 
Nassau 577 F 2d 322 (2nd Cir 1977) in respect of drugs; American Law Institute 
Restatement Second of Torts 1965 § 283C cmt d; Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts 178; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 232; Epstein 
Cases and Materials on Torts 122. 
152  See Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 178. 
153  See McGuire v Almy 8 NE 2d 760 (Mass 1936); Polmatier v Russ 537 A 2d 468 
(Conn 1988); Williams  v Kearby 775 P 2d 670 (Kan App 1989); Restatement 
Second of Torts § 895J (1979); American Law Institute Restatement Third of Torts 
2010 § 11(c); Epstein Cases and Materials on Torts 50. 
154  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 177.  
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to the standard of the reasonable person.155 Holding insane persons to a 
standard that they cannot meet has been criticised.156 The reasons for 
holding them to the reasonable person standard include that it is difficult to 
differentiate between one's bad judgment and one’s mental incapacity; that 
it is fair to the plaintiff to receive compensation for harm done to him; that it 
will encourage those who are charged with the care of the mentally 
incapacitated to take care of them and control them with more care;157 and 
that it is costly to determine the capabilities of a person with a mental 
impairment.158 Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick159 refer to two cases that have 
applied as exceptions to the general rule. In one of them a court in 
Wisconsin160 held that a person cannot be held liable for conduct as a result 
of a sudden unforeseeable insanity and in the other, a court in New York161 
found a defendant who became insane "as a result of extraordinary efforts 
to protect the plaintiff" not liable. The standard of care applied to a mentally 
incapacitated person, whether he is suffering a mental impairment162 or 
insanity163 etc, remains the standard of the reasonable person, not the 
standard of the reasonable person affected by a mental deficiency or 
insanity.  
It is reasonable not to hold a person liable who is unaware of his own 
disability or physical limitation, as the condition was reasonably 
unforeseeable. This approach is applied in English law and in a sense 
followed in South African law. An anomaly applies in American law to 
persons with mental illnesses or mental impairments, where such subjective 
illness or impairment is not considered in adjusting the standard or nullifying 
the requirement of conduct. Such persons are in a sense held strictly liable. 
Even though reasons have been provided, and holding such person to the 
                                            
155  See for example, Kuhn v Zabostsky 1967, 9 Ohio St 2d 129, 224 NE 2d 137; Jolley 
v Powell Fla App 1974 299 So 2d 647; American Law Institute Restatement Second 
of Torts 1965 § 283B cmt b; cases cited by Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the 
Law of Torts fn 32; Epstein Cases and Materials on Torts 120. 
156  See Alexander and Szasz 1967 Notre Dame L Rev 24; authority cited by Keeton et 
al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 177 fn 33. 
157  Keeton et al Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 177. 
158  Green and Cardi "Basic Questions of Tort Law" 483. 
159  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 225-226. Also see Keeton et al 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 178. 
160  Breunig v American Family Ins 45 Wis 2d 536, 173 NW 2d 619, 49 ALR 3d 179 
(1970). 
161  Williams v Hays 157 NY 541, 52 NE 589 (1899).  
162  Vaughan v Menlove 3 Bing NC 468, 132 Eng Rep 490 (CP 1837); American Law 
Institute Restatement Third of Torts 2010 § 12 cmt b; Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick 
Hornbook on Torts 226 fn 168. 
163  See Creasy v Rusk 730 NE 2d 659 (Ind 2000); Restatement Second of Torts §§ 
283B cmt b, 895J (1979); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 226 fn 
169. 
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reasonable person standard has been criticised, the most plausible reason 
is that it is fair and reasonable to compensate the innocent plaintiff. 
In respect of the tort of negligence, there is generally no duty to act in cases 
of pure omission (nonfeasance) even if harm is foreseeable.164 The question 
is whether the reasonable person would have acted in the circumstances.165 
In American law, just as in English law, "omissions" are regarded as a 
specific category of duty. For the purposes of this contribution, it is sufficient 
to point out with regard to American law too that conduct in the form of an 
omission is considered when determining liability in the tort of negligence. 
Therefore, a failure to act may lead to liability in the tort of negligence, 
provided all the other elements are also present. 
The influence of reasonableness is implicit, too, on the requirement of some 
form of conduct in American law, as it is unreasonable to hold a defendant 
liable under the tort of negligence if there was no omission/nonfeasance on 
the part of the defendant.  
6  The influence of reasonableness on conduct in French 
law 
6.1  Fait générateur (relating to the requirement of conduct) in 
Articles 1382 to 1383 of the French Civil Code166 (hereinafter 
referred to as the "CC") ─ relating to liability for one's own 
personal conduct where fault is required 
According to the requirements of delictual liability under French law, there 
must be a fait générateur, that is, a generating, triggering, wrongful act or 
event.167 There is no precise definition of fait générateur in the CC, but it is 
a requirement for liability for one's own conduct (where fault is required).168 
The term "conduct" is not explicitly referred to as a requirement for delictual 
liability in French legal doctrine as in South African law, but some form of 
conduct falling within the requirement of fait générateur is necessary to 
ground delictual liability. 
                                            
164  See for example, Williams v Southern Calif Gas Co 176 Cal App 4th 591, 98 Cal Rptr 
3d 258 (2009); Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 615. 
165  Dobbs, Hayden and Bublick Hornbook on Torts 618. 
166  French Civil Code of 1804. 
167  Galand-Carval "France" 53. 
168  See Van Dam European Tort Law 57; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 
555-556. 
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In order to ground liability under Articles 1382 to 1383 of the CC, it does not 
matter whether the conduct was voluntary or not. Thus an involuntary act 
by the defendant causing injury to the plaintiff will not negate liability. For 
example, in Lignon v Avril,169 an inexperienced volleyball player accidentally 
fell down during the course of the game coincidentally kicking another player 
and injuring him. The injured player sued the inexperienced player. The 
Cour de Cassation170 held that the inexperienced player was liable even 
though his conduct was involuntary.171 
Article 1382 generally relates to liability for conduct while Article 1383 
specifically provides that "everyone is responsible for the damage caused 
not only by his act but also by his negligence or carelessness".172 Van 
Gerven, Lever and Larouche173 point out that this clause refers to liability 
not only for a positive act, but also for an omission.174 In French law, not 
only a failure to act with regard to a statutory rule, but also "a failure to act 
in accordance with a non-legally-binding rule of proper social conduct can 
also entail liability".175 An obligation to act positively in respect of delictual 
liability may stem from an "obligation of safety" (obligation de sécurité).176 
However, French law does not place particular importance on the positive 
legal duty to act. Furthermore, the requirement of conduct, whether in the 
form of an omission or commission, in cases of fault liability is subsumed 
under the enquiry into faute.177 Faute in French law is a broad concept 
covering aspects of the elements of wrongfulness and fault as understood 
in the South African law of delict.178 
French law in general is more favourable to the plaintiff than other legal 
systems. In respect of the element of conduct (as it is known in the South 
African law of delict) French law really requires just a factual enquiry as to 
whether a generating act or event is present or not. Furthermore, the source 
of the generating act or event may stem from a so-called "act of a thing" or 
                                            
169  Cass civ 2 3 July 1991 90-13158, Bull civ 1991 II 210 111. 
170  The "Supreme Court" in France for both civil and criminal matters. See Galand-
Carval "Liability for Damage Caused by Others" 85. 
171  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 339. 
172  Translated by Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 2. 
173  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 2 fn 4. 
174  Also see Van Dam European Tort Law 56. 
175  Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 281. 
176  This is deemed an obligation of result (obligation de résultat) as opposed to an 
obligation of means (obligation de moyens). See Moréteau "Basic Questions of Tort 
Law" 29. 
177  See Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 298. 
178  The influence of reasonableness on the concept of faute will be discussed in later 
contributions still to be published (see fn 1).  
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another person (where one is responsible for that person).179 But the 
custodian of the thing, or person responsible for another that caused the 
harm or loss, may be held strictly liable.180  
It is therefore unreasonable for delictual liability to follow in France if a 
generating act or event is absent. The requirement of conduct’s being 
"voluntary" involves a normative inquiry (as opposed to the factual inquiry 
as to whether or not there was conduct) which may lead to the negation of 
liability on the part of the defendant where his actions are essentially 
mechanical (as the mental ability to control his muscular movements is 
absent). It is submitted that in the French law of delict, the element of 
conduct is a requirement for delictual liability but in an attenuated form. This 
may be justified and reasonable. In French law, strict liability is more the 
norm and the aim is to protect and compensate the plaintiff. Defendants are 
in any case generally insured against delictual liability. We may take the 
hypothetical example that X, while sleepwalking, shoots at Y, injuring him. 
Y as an innocent victim sustains injury and harm. It may therefore be 
reasonable and justified if the plaintiff receives compensation for his injury 
or loss. In South African law X would not be held delictually liable, as his 
conduct was involuntary (fault is also absent). The only instance in South 
African law where the voluntariness of conduct is ineffectual in negating 
delictual liability is if there was some prior negligent or intentional conduct 
on the part of the defendant that subsequently led to his involuntary 
conduct.181 
In respect of omissions, a failure to act positively in preventing harm, for 
example by warning a bee-keeper that he is spraying insecticide which will 
affect the bees,182 or failing to provide adequate supervision and inspection 
at a stadium resulting in the death of a spectator,183 is unreasonable.184 The 
influence of reasonableness on the requirement of a generating act or event 
in French law is therefore implicit. 
                                            
179  See Van Dam European Tort Law 57; Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort Law 
555-556. 
180  In order to limit the scope of this contribution, strict liability in French law will not be 
discussed. 
181  See para 3 above. 
182  See Cass civ 2 14 June 1972 71-11318, Bull civ 1972 II 180 146, 1973 Jur 423 note 
Lepointe. See the discussion of this case in Van Gerven, Lever and Larouche Tort 
Law 308-309. 
183  See CA Lyon 16 December 1988, JCP 1990 II 21510 observations Collomb. 
184  The influence of reasonableness in French law for wrongful culpable conduct 
stemming from omissions from a comparative perspective will be discussed in a later 
contribution still to be published (see fn 1). 
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7  Conclusion 
In all the jurisdictions discussed in this contribution, some form of conduct, 
whether in the form of an omission or a commission, is required for liability 
in delict or tort law. Naturally, it is unreasonable to hold a person liable 
without conduct which results in the causing of harm or loss. The 
requirement of conduct is explicitly referred to in South African law and is 
recognised as a separate element of liability. In French law this requirement 
goes beyond human behaviour to encompass a generating act or event. In 
Anglo-American law too, even though conduct is not explicitly referred to as 
a requirement in the torts of trespass to a person and the tort of negligence, 
it must be present in order to ground liability. 
As shown in South African, English and American law, the conduct must 
generally be voluntary. An exception applies in American law where a 
person's mental impairment or illness does not nullify conduct. If the conduct 
is involuntary, for example, where the conduct is considered mechanical, 
then there is no conduct and it is unreasonable to hold the wrongdoer liable. 
In situations where a person suffers some kind of disability, such as a 
sudden heart attack or a sudden blackout not caused by his own fault, then 
the conduct is not voluntary and fault is absent. If the defendant forgets to 
take his medication or deliberately does not take it thereby leading to a 
blackout, the principle of "prior fault" applies and the defendant may be held 
liable. Thus, it may be considered unreasonable to hold the person with 
such a condition liable, whether the element of conduct or fault is found to 
be absent. French law, on the other hand, does not require the conduct to 
be voluntary in order to ground liability under Articles 1382 to 1383 of the 
CC. Even though the reasonableness of this may be questioned, it may be 
understood in the light of the French pro-victim stance, the aim of 
compensating the victim, and the tendency to prefer strict liability over fault 
liability.185 
                                            
185  See Moréteau "Basic Questions of Tort Law" 4. 
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